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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:
:

RAYMOND MICHAEL QUINTANA, :
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20030471 -CA

:
INTRODUCTION

The State's sole support for the reliability of fingerprint evidence rests on the
fallacious argument that fingerprints have been admitted in courts without any scientific
basis for over 100 years. This argument ignores the threshold question of whether the
assumptions underlying fingerprint evidence are even true. Contrary to the State's
claims, Utah courts have not addressed this question. Further, the State fails to meet its
burden of proving admissibility given the lack of research on fingerprint identification.
In any event, the State's failure to present any evidence linking the fingerprint to the time
that the crime occurred provided insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Quintana beyond a
reasonable doubt. Regardless of the adequacy of the evidence, the trial judge erred in
failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass because the
evidence was consistent with Mr. Quintana's theory that he could have entered the house
at anytime during a 30-year period without any intent to commit theft.

I.

REGARDLESS OF THE TEST FOR ADMISSIBILITY,
THE STATE CANNOT OVERCOME THE ABSENCE OF
RESEARCH ON THE RELIABILITY OF FINGERPRINT
EVIDENCE AND ITS SOLE RELIANCE ON 100-YEAR
OLD MYTHS ABOUT THAT EVIDENCE.

The State's discussion of the test for admitting fingerprint evidence is unavailing
because, under any test, fingerprint evidence has never been shown to be reliable. The
State simply repeats the unproven assumptions that other courts have relied on for over
100 years. No court or research, including any Utah court, has established the reliability
of fingerprint evidence. Using that evidence to support a criminal conviction amounts to
guesswork in defiance of the high standards required for a criminal conviction under our
constitutional form of government.

A.

In The Absence of Any Testing, Fingerprint Evidence is
Inadmissible Under Any Reliability Standard of Evidence.

Regardless of which standard applies for admitting fingerprint evidence, the State
failed to establish reliability under Rule of Evidence 702. The State concedes that State
v. Mead. 2001 UT 58, Tf40, 27 P.3d 1115, creates "confusion" over whether the
Rimmasch test applies to fingerprint evidence. State's Brief at 12. Nevertheless,
because Mthe scientific principles underlying" fingerprint evidence have never been
shown to be "inherently reliable,"1 fingerprints are not admissible under either the
reliability prong of the Rimmasch test or the general reliability test for established
scientific techniques. State v. Adams. 2000 UT 42, TJ16, 5 P.3d 642 (quoting State v.
2

Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1989)).
Further, Mr. Quintana correctly raises the principles articulated in Rimmasch and
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993). Although
fingerprint evidence is not novel in the sense that courts have used it for decades, the
absence of empirical research places fingerprint identification in the same position as
new scientific theories that have undergone little or no testing. Moreover, Rimmasch and
Daubert expose the fallacies behind the assumptions underlying the supposed reliability
of fingerprint identification. Thus, the analyses in those cases of "the scientific
principles underlying" fingerprint identification directly apply here. Adams, 2000 UT
42,TJ16,5P.3d642.
Instead of addressing the absence of research on the reliability of fingerprint
evidence, the State relies on the only argument cited by other courts in admitting
fingerprint evidence-that courts have admitted fingerprint evidence for over 100 years.
State's Brief at 7-8, 13-15; see Appellant's Brief at 32-39 (citing cases relying primarily
on United States v. Haward, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000), affirmed on same
grounds, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001)). But, this reasoning simply begs the question of
whether fingerprint evidence is reliable. Because no research supports the reliability of
fingerprint identification, such evidence is founded on unproven assumptions.
The State's arguments essentially rest on the general acceptance theory that this
Court discarded long ago. Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Utah 1980). Under
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modern theory for admitting scientific evidence, although "there will usually be no
reason to reject" widespread acceptance of scientific principles, the ultimate test for the
admissibility of scientific evidence is its "inherent reliability." Id. at 1234-35.
"Verification of the basic principle and its application through widespread replication
and practical usage is an appropriate indicium of reliability." Id. at 1233. In contrast, the
State's repeated contention that courts have admitted fingerprint evidence for decades,
entirely overlooks its burden of proving the scientific basis and the reliability of
identifying that evidence. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 393 n.3,407.
The State further relies on general acceptance in attempting to shift its burden of
establishing reliability to Mr. Quintana based on "the long acceptance of fingerprint
evidence...." State's Brief at 16. Not only does the State fail to cite any authority for
this proposal, but Utah law directly contradicts it. The Utah Supreme Court has
unmistakably ruled that "the burden is on the party proffering the evidence to
demonstrate that it has the requisite degree of reliability." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 407.
The State's burden-shifting proposal is simply a disguised reincarnation of the general
acceptance test. In the absence of any evidence that fingerprint identification is
"inherently reliable," the State has the burden of first proving the reliability of the
principles underlying that evidence. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996).
Mr. Quintana has no duty to disprove the validity of an unproven theory. Id.
Even if Mr. Quintana had a burden of producing some evidence, he presented
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numerous grounds for questioning the reliability of fingerprint identification. Contrary
to the State's contentions, defense counsel elicited that the Salt Lake City Police
Department's ("SLCPD") Crime Lab employs no standards for identifying fingerprints.
R. 178: 140-43. Counsel also thoroughly listed the deficiencies in fingerprint
identification and that it had never been shown to be reliable. Id. at 140-49. And, as
detailed in the opening brief, the few studies that have been performed show that
fingerprint identification is a subjective process that is prone to individual interpretation.
Appellant's Brief at 22-25. Even Officer Kido admitted that human errors occur in
identifying fingerprints. R. 178: 167-169.
Mr. Quintana has further established that present theories underlying fingerprint
identification are scientifically unsound. Because new discoveries are constantly being
made, "there is a probability factor in even the most carefully structured scientific
inquiry", including DNA evidence. Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1234 (quoting People v. Slone,
143 Cal.Rptr. 61, 70 (1978)). Because science it always changing, "'seldom is it possible
to exclude all possible chance for error in human endeavor.'" Ij±_ (quoting Slone, 143
Cal.Rptr. at 70). Accordingly, "a computation of probabilities not based on scientifically
established data is inadmissible" under Utah law. IdL. at 1233.
No known probabilities exist for the misidentification of fingerprint evidence.
The State and recent court decisions provide no explanation for exempting fingerprint
evidence from scientific testing, such as probability assessments, determining error rates,

5

establishing minimal standards, and critical peer review. The tradition of admitting
fingerprint evidence simply illustrates that courts have admitted unproven, speculative
assumptions for decades. Until science can establish the reliability of fingerprint
identification, this Court should not admit that evidence. IdL.

B.

Utah Courts Have Not Decided the Challenges
to Fingerprint Evidence Presented in this
Appeal, Including the Absence of Scientific
Testing

The State erroneously asserts that this Court need not address Mr. Quintana's
challenges to fingerprint identification because the Utah Supreme Court determined that
this evidence was reliable in State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 237-238 (Utah 1991).
State's Brief at 6-8. The State misapplies the holding in that case. In Hamilton. the
Utah Supreme Court summarily ruled that fingerprint evidence was not analogous to the
extensive research showing the limited reliability of eyewitness identification evidence:
Hamilton urges that we . . . treat fingerprint evidence as
though it is subject to reliability problems similar to those that
affect eyewitness identification evidence. Science has shown
eyewitness identification testimony to have inherent weaknesses
that almost universally are unappreciated by jurors. Fingerprint
evidence, however, presents no analogous accuracy problems.
Questions that go to the weight to be accorded fingerprint
evidence are fairly obvious and straightforward and are subject
to complete illumination through cross-examination and jury
argument. Thus, we find no reason to conclude that fingerprint
evidence differs from any other circumstantial evidence. The
jury can weigh it with the rest of the evidence in determining a
defendant's guilt.
6

Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 237-238.
Unlike Hamilton, Mr. Quintana has not simply likened fingerprint identification to
evidence that has undergone rigorous scientific testing. Rather, he focuses on the lack of
scientific support for the reliability of fingerprint evidence itself Just like the State's and
other courts' reliance on general acceptance, the Hamilton court simply assumed that
fingerprint evidence presented "no analogous accuracy problems" IdL at 237.
Further, only recent testing has discovered significant reliability problems with
identifying fingerprints. Appellant's Brief at 22-27. Hamilton rested its holding on the
conclusion that ff[q]uestions that go to the weight to be accorded fingerprint evidence are
fairly obvious and straightforward and are subject to complete illumination through
cross-examination and jury argument." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 237-238. But, since
Hamilton was decided in 1991, the defense bar has raised new claims and studies that
undermine the reliability of fingerprint identification. Even the State concedes that
Hamilton "may not have challenged fingerprint evidence on precisely the same grounds
that" Mr. Quintana raises on appeal. State's Brief at 7. Hamilton is limited to its facts
and the arguments presented at the time that case was decided.

C.

The State Failed to Establish the Reliability of
the Identification in This Case

Even assuming that there was evidence establishing the reliability of fingerprint
identification, the State failed to establish the reliability of the identification in this case.
7

Unlike the federal cases that have found the Department of Justice's procedures to be
reliable, the State presented no evidence that the procedures used by SLCPD's examiners
are reliable. See United States v. Plaza. 188 F. Supp.2d 549, 566-71 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
The State's failure to satisfy its burden of establishing the reliability of SLCPD's
procedures provides an independent basis for excluding the identification in this case.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 407.

II.

THE STATE'S FAILURE TO CONNECT THE
FINGERPRINT TO THE TIME OF THE CRIME
PREVENTED A REASONABLE JURY FROM FINDING
GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

Under Utah law and the law from most other states, the single latent fingerprint
found here failed to support the jury's verdicts beyond a reasonable doubt. When
fingerprint evidence serves as the only evidence of guilt, the State must connect the
fingerprint to the time the crime occurred. Given the absence of any other evidence, a
reasonable jury could not have convicted Mr. Quintana without having a reasonable
doubt about his guilt.
Hamilton establishes that when fingerprints are the only evidence supporting a
conviction, the State must show that the fingerprints were left during the time that the
crime occurred. In that case, Utah Supreme Court described two views of fingerprint
evidence:
There are two general approaches to the weight that may be
8

afforded fingerprint evidence. The first, which is based on an
American Law Reports annotation, views fingerprint
evidence with skepticism: "To warrant a conviction, the
fingerprints corresponding to those of the accused must have
been found in the place where the crime was committed
under such circumstances that they could only have been
impressed at the time when the crime was committed."
Annotation, Fingerprints, Palm Prints, or Bare Foot Prints as
Evidence, 28 A.L.R.2d §§ 29, at 1154 (1953); see also
Borumv. United States. 380 F.2d 595, 596-97 (D.C. Cir.
1967). In addition, where only fingerprint evidence links the
defendant to the crime, such evidence is insufficient to
support a conviction. Borum, 380 F.2d at 596-97.
Some jurisdictions apply a variant of the first approach.
While purporting to follow the A.L.R./Borum approach, they
actually have modified it in practice. They appear to follow
A.L.R./Borum only when questionablefingerprintevidence is
the only evidence inculpating the defendant. In instances
where additional evidence supports the conviction, these
courts generally treat fingerprint evidence as they do other
circumstantial evidence. They allow the trier of fact to
determine the weight it is to be given.
Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 236-37 (string citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court
adopted the "second approach . . . and treat[ed] fingerprint evidence like any other piece
of circumstantial evidence whether or not there is additional evidence." Id. at 237; State
v. Moran. 699 A.2d 20, 23 (R.I. 1997) (conviction can rest entirely on circumstantial
evidence).
As this ruling establishes, a conviction will rarely, if ever, occur based solely on a
single fingerprint. Other jurisdictions agree. See. M.C. Dransfield, Annotation,
Fingerprints. Palm Prints, or Bare Foot Prints as Evidence. 28 A.L.R.2d 1115, §§ 28-30,
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at 1154 (1953 & Supp. 2004); Monroe v. State. 652 A.2d 560, 564 (Del. 1995) (citing
other jurisdictions). Like the decision in Hamilton, these courts conclude that "a
conviction cannot be sustained solely on a defendant's fingerprint's being found on an
object at a crime scene unless the State demonstrates that the prints could have been
impressed only at the time the crime was committed." Monroe. 652 A.2d at 564; State v.
Bridge, 955 P.2d 418,419 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). This approach applies with particular
force when, as here, fingerprints are recovered from moveable objects. Bridge. 955 P.2d
at 419.
The State presented no evidence tying Mr. Quintana to the time of the crime. No
one saw him near the burgled home. The police never recovered the stolen property or
connected it to Mr. Quintana, at all. See. Monroe, 652 A.2d at 562, 567 (lone fingerprint
insufficient to support guilt where police located none of the stolen goods). Further, the
State presented no expert testimony on when the fingerprints had been placed. See
MoraEU 699 A.2d at 23 (lack of expert testimony on durability of fingerprints supported
insufficiency of the evidence). At best, the evidence only supports that Mr. Quintana
touched the box in the Cannons' chest of drawers "at some time" during a 30-year period.
State v. Mitchell, 506 S.E.2d 523, 525 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998), (citing Hood v. State, 860
S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)), affirmed on same grounds . 535 S.E.2d 126,127
(S.C. 2000). Absent some connection to the time of the burglary, the jury's verdict was
"'based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of
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guilt.'" State v. Lvman. 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v.
Brown. 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997), and State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah
1993)).
The State erroneously contends that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the verdict supports a reasonable inference of guilt. State's Brief at 19. The State
asserts that ff[n]o evidence suggested that defendant had access to the Cannon's home at
any time other than when the burglary occurred." Id. at 20. But, this argument assumes
that Mr. Quintana touched the box during the hour and-a-half while the Cannons were at
church.
This Court has conclusively ruled that the trier of fact may not infer guilt based on
an "assumption." State v. Lavman, 953 P.2d 782, 787 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), affirmed,
1999 UT 79,1[16, 985 P.2d 911. In Layman, for example, the appellant drove his father
and his father's friend from Ogden to Vernal, Utah. Layman, 953 P.2d at 784. The
father and the friend carried methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia with the intent to
sell the drugs upon their arrival in Vernal. Id. Although the appellant drove and was
under the influence of methamphetamine, there was no evidence connecting him with his
father's and the friend's plan to possess and distribute drugs. Id. Following a bench
trial, the trial judge convicted the appellant of possessing drugs with intent to distribute.
Id at 785.
This Court ruled that the circumstantial "evidence and all reasonable inferences
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therefrom, even viewed in a light most favorable to the State,f! failed to support guilt. Id.
at 790. Because the convictions lfrest[ed] on a fundamental assumption for which the
record contains no evidence^] that assumption [] allowed the court 'to indulge an
inference upon an inference that could lead but to conjecture not justifying a conclusion
that [possession had been proven] beyond a reasonable d o u b t . . . . ' " I d . at 787 (quoting
State v. George, 481 P.2d 667, 667 (1971)). Although, in making its decision, this Court
erroneously relied on the discredited requirement to exclude every reasonable hypothesis
of innocence, the Utah Supreme Court upheld this Court's conclusion on the inadequacy
of the evidence on certiorari review. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ^[16, 985 P.2d 911.
In this case, the State similarly assumes that Mr. Quintana touched the box at the
time the crime took place. This assumption resulted in the State resorting to indulging in
"inference upon inference" to connect Mr. Quintana to the fingerprint. Lyman, 966 P.2d
at 282 n.3. But, the State produced no evidence that even hinted that Mr. Quintana
entered or was even near the Cannons' home during the relevant time frame. Because
the State can only assume that Mr. Quintana placed the fingerprint on the box "at the
time the crime was committed," the evidence ff'give[s] rise to only remote or speculative
possibilities of guilt.'" Monroe. 652 A.2d at 564; Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281; (quoting
Brown, 948 P.2d at 344, and Workman, 852 P.2d at 985).
The State's reliance on viewing the evidence most favorably to the jury's verdicts
also effectively shifts to the defense the burden of connecting Mr. Quintana to the time
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that the crime occurred. Mr. Quintana had "no obligation to offer a credible, lawful
explanation for the existence of his . . . fingerprints on the" box. Monroe . 652 A.2d at
565. Rather, the State had to prove that "the prints could have been impressed only at the
time the crime was committed." Id. at 564. In the absence of any connection, the State's
case was "'based on pure speculation.'" Bridge, 955 P.2d at 419 (quoting Mikes v. Borg.
947 P.2d 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1990), cert, denied 505 U.S. 1229 (1992)). Accordingly, the
lone fingerprint provided inadequate circumstantial evidence of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281; Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 236-37.

III.

BECAUSE INTENT WAS DISPUTED AND THE
EVIDENCE WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE DEFENSE
THEORY, THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS REQUIRED TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LESSER OFFENSE OF
CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

Even if the fingerprint evidence was admissible and the State presented sufficient
evidence of guilt, the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser
included offense of criminal trespass. The State asserts that no instruction was needed
because "there was no evidence to suggest that the defendant entered a property
intending to do anything other than commit a theft." State's Brief at 23. But, the cases
the State cites do not apply here because, unlike this case, the evidence in those cases
raised no ambiguities about the defendants' actions or intent.
In three of the State's cases, the prosecution presented eyewitness testimony that
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the defendant actually took the stolen items and intended to steal them. State v. Bales,
675 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah 1983) (witness saw defendant carrying jewelry and firearms out
of burgled house); State v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 215, 216 (Utah 1983) (defendant caught in
the act of breaking into a hotel room); State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 663 (Utah Ct. App.
1992) (witness saw defendant with stolen items in hand). Here, there was no such
evidence of an intent to commit theft not only because the State failed to connect Mr.
Quintana to the time of the crime, but the State presented absolutely no other evidence
connecting him to the crime scene, at all. Rather, the evidence in this case was
"ambiguous [and] subject to [] alternative interpretation that required the [trial] court to
instruct on a lesser offense." State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983)
Further, Baker does not apply because the defendant in that case did not dispute
the alleged act. Rather, he argued that he was too intoxicated to form the necessary
intent. 671 P.2d at 159. In contrast, Mr. Quintana has never admitted entering the
Cannons' home at the time of the burglary nor does he raise an affirmative defense.
Instead, he contends that the evidence was "ambiguous or subject to [] alternative
interpretation" because he could have entered the home on a different occasion during a
30-year period without any intent to commit a theft. IcL
As opposed to the State's cases, State v. Knight. 2003 UT App 354, 79 P.3d 969,
directly applies to this appeal. Mr. Quintana's claim that he could have entered the
Cannons' home anytime during a 30-year period rationally supports a simple trespass.
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Id. at T|16. Trial judges must instruct the jury on lesser offenses when the "evidence is
consistent with both the defendant's and the State's theory of the case." IcL. at ^J17.
Instructing on the lesser crime is "especially necessary when intent is in dispute" as it is
in this case. Id. at ^[16 n.3, ^[17. Because the State cannot show when Mr. Quintana had
entered the Cannons' home, the evidence is equally consistent with a trespass as it is with
burglary with intent to commit theft. The trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury on Mr.
Quintana's theory "undermined" the jury's verdict and, therefore, requires reversal and a
new trial. Id. at^[17.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Quintana requests this Court to reverse his convictions for burglary and theft
because the trial judge admitted unreliable fingerprint evidence and that evidence served
as the only evidence of guilt. In any event, the State failed to present sufficient evidence
of guilt. At the very least, this Court should grant Mr. Quintana a new trial because the
trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of criminal trespass.
Dated this }g*_ day of April, 2004.
KENT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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